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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 17037

RONALD G. CLARK,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with theft, a third degree felony,
in violation of Sections 76-6-404 and 76-6-412(1) {b} (iii),
U.C.A.

(1953), as amended, for stealing three turkeys from a

turkey farm near Ephraim, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At a bench trial on February 11, 1980, appellant was
convicted as charged.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction on constitutional grounds.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was charged by information with the offense
of theft, a felony of the third degree, to which appellant
entered a plea of not guilty.

(R., pp. 5-6)

At a bench trial commencing February 11, 1980, respondent
called as witnesses Richard Olsen and Douglas Olsen, owners of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a turkey farm near Ephraim, Utah.

The Olsens testified that

in the early morning hours of October 19, 1979, they heard or
saw the appellant club three turkeys to death in a turkey pen
on their farm.

They further testified that appellant was

carrying the turkeys to his truck when they challenged him,
and he dropped them inside the pen.

A discussion ensued and

appellant was thereafter arrested and charged.,

(Tr., pp. 14-26)

After a stipulation between counsel concerning the
admission of exhibits and testimony of the investigating officer,
respondent rested its case.
Appellant's attorney then moved to dismiss the charge
on the basis that the State failed to prove all of the elements
necessary to constitute theft.

(Tr., pp. 30-·32)

The Court

denied the motion and appellant rested and submitted the case.
The Court then found the appellant guilty as charged and
ordered a presentence report to be prepared.

At that time, the

Court stated on the record that he considered the matter to be
extremely serious and particularly to the community where the
offense occurred.

(Tr., pp. 33-34)

The sentencing proceeding was held on April 9, 1980.
At that time, the Court placed appellant on probation for two
years, imposed a fine of $1,500.00, ordered restitution of

$45.·oo

(the value of the 3 turkeys) and ordered that appellant

serve 90 days in jail as a condition of probation.
During the sentencing proceeding,. the Court made several
references to making an example of the appellant based upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the attitudes of the community and particularly the turkey
farmers and livestock producers.

(Tr., pp. 47-50.

At one point, the Court compared the theft of the turkeys
to a homicide and otherwise indicated that the severity of the
sentence was intended as a warning to others.

(Tr., p. 47)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 76-6-412 (1) (b) (iii) I
U.C.A. (1953) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of
Utah guarantee equal protection of the law.
The test of a statute for purposes of equal protection,
absent some form of invidious discrimination, is that the
statute must be grounded upon a rational basis..

McGowan v.

Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393
(1961)

Thus, if there is no rational basis for a discrimination

as to the classification of a criminal offense, then such a
classification must fail as a denial of equal protection.
Appellant asserts that the classification of theft of
poultry as a third degree felony constitutes a denial of equal
protection in that Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii) makes no
reference to the value of the animals stolen in determining
the felonious nature of the offense.
The standard for defining the value of property in
determining the degree of theft as to ordinary personal
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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property is the "market value" of the stolen items.

State v.

Logan , 5 6 3 P . 2 d 811 (Utah 19 7 7}
There exists no valid reason why the theft of domestic
animals should not also be classified into degrees based upon
the market value of the animals.

In the instant case, the value

of the stolen turkeys was $45.00 which, under Section 76-6-412
(1) (d), U.C.A.

(1953), would constitute only a Class B

misdemeanor.
Appellant concedes that, at common law, there may have
been a justification for classifying theft of domestic animals
as grand larceny.

In centuries past, agriculture was characterized

by the small family farm, whereby the theft of a single horse
.or cow may well have jeopardized the economic survival of a
family.
To equate agrarian conditions as they existed at conunon
law with modern life is preposterous at best.

The modern live-

stock industry is characterized by large mechanized and automated farms engaged in the production of thousands of animals
for market.
Thecpplication of Utah's livestock theft statute is such
that larceny of 3 live turkeys from a turkey farm is felonious
while theft of the same 3 turkeys, slaughtered and packaged,
from a grocery store is punishable only as a misdemeanor.
To contend that an animal intended for slaughter is intrinsically
more valuable to the farmer who raises it than to the grocer
who retails it is a proposition so irrational as to be absurd.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
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As a separate equal protection challenge, Section 76-6412, U.C.A.

(1953), when construed as a whole, invests a

prosecutor with the discretion to charge a person with a felony
or misdemeanor for the same act.

Thus, for the act involved

herein, the prosecutor could elect to pursue the matter as a
Class B misdemeanor based on the value of the turkeys or,
as in appellant's case, he could treat the matter as a felony.
The comparison extends even further in that a statute
separate from the theft statutes would also classify appellant's
act as a Class B misdemeanor.

Inasmuch as the turkeys were

clubbed to death, the prosecution could have elected to proceed
against appellant for a misdemeanor under Section 76-9-301,
U.C.A.

(1953) for cruelty to animals.
Thus, not only is there no rational basis for the classi-

fication of theft of poultry as a felony, the livestock theft
statute, in its application, must be found to violate equal
protection by allowing a prosecutor to charge either a felony
or misdemeanor based upon the same set of facts.

State v.

Blanchey, 454 P.2d 841 (Wash. 1969); State v. Langworthy,
Wash. App., 583 P.2d 1231 (1978).
Appellant asserts that Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii),
should be held unconstitutional as violative of equal protection
on either or both of the bases set forth above.

-5-
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POINT II
SECTION 76-6-412 (.1) (b) (iii)
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A
VIOLATION OF THE PROHIBITION
OF PRIVATE OR SPECIAL LAWS
Article VI, Section 26 of the Constitution of Utah prohibits the enactment of private or special laws "where a general
law can be applicable."

Appellant contends that such is the

case with regard to Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii).

The general

theft provisions which classify offenses on the basis of value
are available to prosecute one who steals poultry.
The effect of Utah's livestock theft statute is to provide special criminal sanctions intended to protect a private
industry, namely livestock and poultry raising.
Once again, the test for classifications as to special
or private laws is that of reasonableness.

Utah Farm Bureau

Ins. Co. v. Utah Ins. Guaranty Assn., 564 P.2d 751 (Utah 19.77)
Appellant contends that, once again, Utah's livestock theft
statute fails that test.

Utah's statute is particularly suspect in that, historically,
theft of poultry was not included as a felony offense.

The

provision adding poultry to the list of domestic animals as to
which larceny constituted a felony was only enacted by the Utah
legislature in 1977.

It is apparent that the recent inclusion

of poultry is a response to lobbying by Utah's substantial
turkey raising industry.
At least as to the larger, hoofed domestic animals there
might exist a valid presumption that, in view of modern prices,
-6- by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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even the value of one such animal would be sufficient to
constitute felony theft on a market value basis.

Clearly, the

same presumption would not apply to a single turkey.
A review of surrounding jurisdictions indicates that
those which have affirmed the constitutionality of felony theft
laws concerning domestic animals have involved statutes which
define livestock as hoofed animals, not poultry.

State v.

Feeley, 552 P.2d 66 (Mont. 1976); State v. Pacheco, 81 N.M.
97, 463 P.2d 521 (1969); Houser v. Fourth Judicial District
Court, 345 P.2d 766 (Nev. 1959).
The inclusion of poultry in Section 76-6-412(1) (b) (iii)
is a clear violation of the constitutional prohibition against
special legislation and mandates a reversal of appellant's
conviction.
POINT III
THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT
WAS EXCESSIVE AND ARBITRARILY
AND PREJUDICIALLY IMPOSED
Assuming, arguendo, that the statute under which
appellant was convicted is constitutionally valid, the sentence
in appellant's case was unduly harsh and imposed prejudicially
in response to pressure from the community and special interests.
During the sentencing proceeding, the Court referred to
pressure on the prosecutor by the farm cormnunity and livestock
and poultry interests to seek a harsh penalty for appellant.
(Tr., pp. 47-48)
Further, the court noted the desire of the community,
reflecting his own inclination, to make an example of appellant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At one point, the Court even compared the offense in degree
of seriousness to a homicide.

(Tr. , pp. 4 7- 5 0)

Appellant asserts that the imposition of a lengthy
period of probation, 90 days imprisonment and a stiff fine of
$1,500.00 was motivated, not by a concern for justice,

but

rather by a concern for the protection of the property rights
of a special interest group, the livestock and poultry farmers.
Appellant contends the severity of the penalty imposed
bore no relation to the nature of the offense of stealing 3
turkeys worth $45.00 nor with the appellant's character, i.e.,
no serious prior criminal record and a stable background and
employment history.
Consequently, appellant urges the Court, alternatively,
to find the sentence of the trial court to be excessive and
arbitrarily imposed, despitethe fact that it was within the
statutory limits for a third degree felony.
CONCLUSION
Appellant requests the Court to find the relevant statute
unconstitutional and reverse his conviction.
.

DATED th.is

t

-~'? \.·,day of September, 1980.

.-.::<-~

\

1

ROBERT VAN SCIVER

<

Attorney for Appellant
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